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This paper analyses the relation between dividends and the mature level of a 
firm, by using market-to-book ratio as a proxy for Tobin’s Q, and Tobin’s Q as a 
indicator of either existence of new positive NPV projects or maturity level reached. 
The existent theory argues that the dividend payment decision either conveys 
information regarding future earnings (Signalling Theory) or is based on an Agency 
Theory Problem, concerning both Managers-Shareholders and Shareholders-
Debtholders relationships.  
Here, another dividend signalling power is partially found, as dividend changes 
in period t seem to indicate a tendency in high Q firms to became more mature in t+1. 
This relation was not found for low Q firms, indicating that already mature firms do not 
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1. Introduction  
This paper analyses a large sample based on UK listed firms’ data. The 
signalling theory is tested, paying particular attention to the mature firms’ issue. There 
is no consensus if dividends do signal future earnings or the fact that firms had reached 
a mature level. Furthermore, the magnitude of the signal is also questionable, this is, 
whether the size of the change in the dividend has any relation when the quality of the 
signal.  
The preliminary problem consists on determining which firm can be considered 
as a “mature firm” or when does a firm become “mature”.  We approach this issue by 
using market-to-book ratio as a proxy for Tobin’s Q.  
Moreover, this study provides further explanations on the dividend issue, using 
the existent comparative based studies, such as the ones carried out by Vaughan and 
Williams (1998) for signalling in future earnings and several studies presented by Ferris 
et al (2002) and Ferris et al (2004)  approaching the maturity issue on dividends 
signalling. 
Hence, we attempt to find supportive evidence on whether dividends signal a 
higher level of maturity or not.  
Thus, Section 2 defines the sample data used by defining the criteria applied to 
filter data, in order to prevent some possible biasing problems. Section 3 presents a 
comprehensive descriptive statistics and frequency count on major variables used, 
which was also used to infer about payout trend throughout the considered period. 
Section 4 explains the methodology used, the hypotheses considered (and the 
underlying intuition) and justifies some choices made when defining the models for the 
regressions. In Section 5 all the empirical findings and results from two sample tests and   - 4 - 
logit regressions are presented and analysed, allowing us to draw the conclusions and 
final remarks presented in Section 6. 
 
2. Sample and data selection 
From the available data on Datastream of all the UK stock exchange listed firms, 
all financials and utility companies were removed. We deleted financials companies due 
to the fact that often these companies own other companies and, therefore, the inclusion 
of these companies can introduce some bias in the results. Gwilym et al (2004) refers to 
this problem as double counting. Utilities were removed due to the biasing regulations 
in those sectors and due to shareholders’ special characteristics (Ferris et al 2004).The 
data is available from 1994 to 2002, spread through 27 Datastream industry 
classifications.  
Some variables forced the loss of some observations, such as lagged variables or 
variables using data from previous periods and for particular variable-year ; also, 
unavailable data force to delete all the other variables from the same period in that 
particular observation. Data filtering is summarized in Table 2. 
Table 1 presents a definition for all variables used. SFUNDS were used as proxy 
for book value of equity and MVBV was used as proxy for Tobin’s Q. In order to 
prevent size bias, some variables were scaled by MKTCAP, where stated. 
We also trimmed some outliers. When using MVBV, we exclude 1% extreme 
values to prevent outliers from driving results. More specifically, firms with MVBV 
value above 26.98 or under -8.13 were excluded. OPPROFM is used as a proxy for 
earnings, as it is registered before any payout. Furthermore, any negative OPPROFM 
was disregarded in sample used. Nevertheless, 22 negative MVBV observations were   - 5 - 
included, despite of negative book value, as they represent firms with positive 
OPPROFM and ORDDIVM.  
 
3. Descriptive statistics and payout trend analysis 
Our descriptive analyses are split into three different approaches. First, we 
present a historical description by year, which allows us to understand how the variables 
evolve through time and their trends. Second, we analyse by industry, aiming to capture 
industry effects. Finally, we present a pooled description for the entire sample.  
One should first infer about basic statistic characteristics of the main variables 
used, in order to draw any conclusions about corporate payout policy, namely about any 
dividend signalling. In addition, a summary analysis on recent payout history and trend 
will surely help any further studies. All results are presented in Table 3. 
A primary analysis allows us to conclude that dividends are still much more used 
than any other distribution method. Furthermore, dividends seem to concentrate around 
the mean, as kurtosis is very high. The skewness also allows concluding that higher 
dividend levels are concentrated in fewer companies, just as Ferris et al (2004) claimed. 
The same effect can be seen in CASHM and OPPROFM. Interesting to notice a 
negative NETINCM mean, a first sign that this variable, if used in further studies, can 
bias results, as net income is a book value determined after the cash distribution.  
A final remark to dividend changes, as the values seem to concentrate around the 
average, despite also some skewness; changes in dividends have a positive mean, which 
can be explained by the suggested lack of elasticity of dividends to decreases. 
The next step is to analyse those descriptive statistics by year and by industry. 
Table 4 present results by year, while Table 5 present results sorted by industries. The 
firsts are relevant to infer about any payout trend followed in the last years, while the   - 6 - 
latter represent an important piece of information regarding industry based differences, 
namely in which distribution is concern. In addition, Table 6 presents frequency count, 
showing differences between the two sub-samples (high and low Q) throughout the 
years. Finally, in Table 7 the descriptive statistics for ORDDIVM variable is included, 
divided into high and low Q. 
The first major conclusion to be taken is the fact that the average ordinary 
dividend payment level has been constant throughout the years (scaled by MTKCAP); 
conversantly, the company’s size seems to grow. This enables not only to state that 
absolute dividend level has been increasing, but also that this dividend payment is 
concentrated in the bigger firms. This totally supports Ferris et al (2004), showing that 
fewer companies are paying more dividends. This may also explain why dividend 
changes seem to decrease through time. 
Regarding other distribution methods, is clear the increase in repurchases, as UK 
legal system provided better conditions for companies to undertake open market 
repurchases. Globally, the total payout seem to increase, despite with higher standard 
deviation, result of the use of repurchases instead of dividends, allowing higher 
flexibility in cash distributions. Also important the fact that MVBV seem to decrease 
lately, reflecting economic recession around the world, as new investments seem more 
difficult to find. Despite this, cash levels have been increasing, in a higher rate than 
dividends or total payout, which may give space for higher agency costs. 
Analysing now the industries, the first important fact is that the biggest dividend 
payers are the Tobacco, Automobile and Engineering & Machinery; conversantly, the 
industries that less dividends pay are precisely the ones who need more investment for 
R&D, which therefore use the cash available as funding, instead of expensive debt or 
equity in the capital markets.   - 7 - 
Concerning Table 6, while in terms of frequency one can check the highest 
number of observations for high Q firms, in terms of overall percentage, 1997 was the 
year where the highest concentration of any kind of firms is observable. Moreover, 1998 
is when the most of low Q firms are observed. Considering each year, one can check 
that 2002 is when the number of observations are more balanced, as the observations are 
55.4% for high Q and 44.6% for low Q. 
Similarly, from Table 7 we can clearly check that low Q firms have a higher 
dividend mean and smaller standard deviation. This indicates, obviously, that given that 
a firm reaches a certain mature level and/or runs out of new positive NPV projects, the 
solution found is to transfer the available cash to its shareholders. Also curious, the first 
quartile does no include any dividend payment. This should be surprising, as low Q 
firms can also be distressed firms, and therefore not able to pay any dividends. Also 
significant, the very high figure for kurtosis in high Q firms, as this reveals more values 
in the tails (more extreme values), and less concentration of values between the mean 
and the tails. 
This analysis clearly shows fundamental differences between low and high Q 
observations, which provides statistical evidence to advance to further studies. This 
indicates primarily that any conclusion to be drawn must take into account two different 
states (high and low), thus any further tests should attempt to test separately dividend 
signalling both for high and low Q firms. The following Section will therefore propose a 
methodology taking into account the results found here. 
 
4. Proposed methodology 
This study firstly tests the signalling power of dividends on future earnings, 
using the model proposed by Vaughan and Williams (1998), in order to, afterwards,   - 8 - 
apply a model based on Grullon et al (2002) and Ferris et al (2002) to infer about 
mature firms consistent dividend signalling
1.  
The inclusion of a test for earnings predictability
2 is done in order to allow 
clearer conclusions on the signalling power of dividends. In order for dividends to be 
seen as a signal, this must not be ambiguous, therefore evidence supporting both 
earnings predictability and mature firms would lead to fewer support
3. 
Tests presented are based on logit regressions, with prior use of  a t-test and w-
test, in order to clarify the statistic characteristics of the sub samples, which were 
divided into high MVBV and low MVBV, standing MVBV (as stated in Section 2) as a 
proxy for Tobin’s Q. The lack of significance when testing the two sub samples’ 
statistical difference would ultimately result on inconsistency with the suggested 
hypothesis and would force to withhold any further tests. 
Theoretically, Tobin’s Q stands for the “ratio of the market value of new 
additional investment goods to their replacement cost”, but it has been widely used as a 
proxy for growth or investment opportunities, when Q is higher than one. Conversantly, 
low Q values (Q<1) stand as a proxy for a higher mature state, as fewer positive NPV 
projects are available to the firm.  
The use of “a proxy of a proxy” is potentially misleading, however, is of 
straightforward use and the statistic significance does not change radically by using 
other methods. 
Furthermore, the natural logarithm of MTKCAP, as well as ∆OPPROFM,  are 
used as control variables for size in all regression, following Vaughan and Williams’ 
                                                 
1 Maturity and mature firms are used with the same meaning, this is, an indication that a firm has reached 
a certain level of presence in the market. 
2 In appendix. 
3 Concerning firms’ maturity, based on the Ferris et al (2002) model but with some notions used in 
Vaughan and Williams (1988), some other models were built, in order to infer about dividends signalling 
power on this particular context. Also, some prior tests were conducted and not included, to infer about 
the significance of some variables, as explained further ahead. 
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(1988) model, in order to avoid misleading results. It is acknowledged the potential 
noise created by the inclusion of a control variable (MTKCAP) technically correlated 
with other variables, as some are scaled by it, however its inclusion has more benefits 
than other alternatives, such as scaling by total assets. MTKCAP clearly has a more 
realistic value than total assets, as it is determined by the market and not by accounting 
rules which often fail to capture the intrinsic value. 
Dummy variables for both years and industries were included to detect if any 
particular year and/or industry allows us to draw a more specific conclusion.  
Grullon et al (2002) suggest that dividends, instead of a signal for future 
earnings, might contain information about discount rates, and if that is so, then it would 
signal firm’s systematic risk.  
In the study presented here, this idea is developed, starting from Grullon et al 
(2002) suggestion and adapting models from Ferris et al (2002) and Ferris et al (2004) 
research proposal about payout firms’ characteristics. The assumption that MVBV may 
indicate if a firm has reached a mature state is crucial
4, as well as the assumption that 
this might be observable through available data and the effect is still present one period 
(fiscal year) after. Here relies the major difference to Grullon et al (2002). The study 
presented next, analyses if this signal can be observable in a more extended period, 
which is reasonable, as the mature state it is not a temporary state and the decision to 
pay dividends (and also its “stickiness”) do not allow short term effect only.  
The fundamental idea behind the following tests is, therefore, to infer whether a 
firm being mature explains the fact it pays dividends, and if so, can dividends indicate 
that a firm is becoming mature or “more mature” one fiscal year after. In other words, 
does dividends signal consistently the change towards a mature state, or Q=1.  
                                                 
4 Grullon et al (2002) has made a similar assumption on Market-to-Book ratio.   - 10 - 
The crucial regressions presented use as dependent variable Tobin’s Q decrease 
or increase in a binary mode (1,0) in t+1, given that they had either high or low Q in t, 
creating therefore, less strong results due to fewer observations inclusion, but more 
specific and accurate conclusions. The purpose is to test whether the signal occurs in 
each “maturity state”, given that for already mature firm dividends should not signal a 
difference in state, but the state itself; on the other hand, for high Q firms, dividend 
would represent a signal of change. 
According with the existent theory, it is assumed that cash levels represent either 
investment opportunities or mature level; similarly, Tobin’s Q is seen as an investment 
opportunity ratio, as well a good proxy for a firms’ maturity level. Given this, one 
expects firms with high Q and high cash levels not to make any payout, as they can 
follow positive NPV projects. Conversantly, firms with low Q and high cash levels 
should be transferring wealth to shareholders, whether to avoid agency costs or to signal 
either high future earnings or maturity level. The only certain is that these three 
scenarios are mutually exclusive, as – if anything else – signals should be clear of its 
purpose. 
Before any attempt for a statistical test, one should first define the underlying 
hypotheses. The study relies on two basic hypotheses. The first one (H1) is the 
supposition that the “mature state” of a company explains the dividend payment 
decision. Theory argues that mature firms are the ones with less available new NPV 
projects, however, the excess cash within the firm may create agency problems and its 
transfer to shareholders can be seen as a good signal by the market.
5 
                                                 
5 It is likewise assumed that non-profitable firms can not survive, and therefore, only mature but 
profitable firms persist.   - 11 - 
Based on H1, the second hypothesis (H2) supposes that the dividend itself stands 
as a signal indicating a step towards a more mature status of its issuers in the next 
period. It is expected the signal to be much stronger for high Q firms. 
The first question is whether the achievement of a more mature status by a firm 
explains the fact it pays dividends or not; and the second question is whether dividends 
indicate a higher mature level in the future. In other words, does the dividend 
consistently signal a variation towards a more mature state? 
  
5. Empirical findings 
5.1. Two Sample Analysis: high Q vs. low Q firms 
The main purpose of the two samples analysis is to uncover possible biasing 
similarities between some fundamental variables across the sub samples. Ultimately, it 
would turn any further test useless if when using as a basic assumption different high 
and low Q firms, the variables were not statistically different. 
Basic t-test procedures are shown in Table 8. W-test (Table 9), by not assuming 
normality, would allow testing dummy variables. Despite this, all the previously 
referred variables had their results in t-test confirmed. The INIT result is expected as 
high Q firms would initiate dividends more often than low Q, as according to the theory, 
firms with fewer positive NPV projects and cash available, starting, therefore, 
distributing cash, either by dividend, repurchases or any other method. All these 
findings are presented in Tables 8 and 9. 
Table 8 shows, as expected, TOTPAY is significantly different across the 
samples, as mature firms should pay more dividends, due to their growth stop or 
decrease; the same applies for ORDIVM. The OMR_VM is a special case, though.   - 12 - 
Despite this test reveals statistic difference, showing that indeed, high Q firms do have a 
different mean from low Q firms, the prior tests made do not allow clear conclusion 
about this result.  
Also, mature firms are expected to reveal bigger MTKCAP, which is also shown 
with the t-stat of -6.44; obviously, the MVBV as the original variable from which firms 
were difference between high and low Q confirms the difference. 
Not surprisingly also, OPPROFM do not change, as this variable appears prior to 
any cash distribution and both high and low Q firms include prosperous and less 
prosperous firms with not significantly different means. 
Finally, as the t-test requires the normality for inferring about differences across 
means, the dummies variables were not included in the t-tests. 
  By analysing Table 8, one can check that all the variables tested in the t-test are 
confirmed by the w-test. In addition, the dummy variables are generally also statistically 
different. Despite this, INIT dummy variable (dividend initiation) is not statistically 
significant across the two sample considered. 
  
5.2. Logit Regressions 
 
The first step would be to know whether low Q and cash levels determine the 
decision for a firm to pay dividends. According to the theory, mature firms and firms 
with few positive NPV projects to undertake and with high levels of cash, should 
transfer cash, being the dividend payout one of the means for it.  
 
Logit 1:   - 13 - 
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The regression (Logit 1) partially confirms this, as the fact that a firm pays out 
dividend in t+1 is explained by being a low Q firm in t+1 (p-value <0.0001). However 
the cash levels in the previous period have a smaller significance (p<22%), as the cash 
levels are not only connected with dividends but also to other cash distribution methods. 




ε β β β
β β β α
+ + + +
+ ∆ + + + = +
f f i i t
t t t t
INDC FYR MKTCAP




3 2 1 1  
The second regression (Logit 2) attempted, unlike Logit 1, to infer if dividend 
payment explains the fact that companies have a low Q. In fact, given the good fit and 
very positive global test, one can state that, as expected, dividends and open market 
repurchases payment decision (simply a “yes” or “no”) do seem to explain whether a 
company has a low Q or not.  
 
Logit 3: 
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Moreover, also Logit 3 confirms that changes in cash levels are explained by 
cash distributions. Obviously, this sensitivity test simply confirms that changes is cash 
levels are only partially explained by these distributions; if the company still has 
positive NPV projects, it would not forgo them.  
   - 14 - 
Logit 4: 
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Lastly, Logit 4 provides further evidence that positive changes in dividends are 
associated with mature state of a company (high Q) and with changes in cash levels. 
Obviously, when a firm increases dividends, these are the main factors behind it, and 
the explanatory power of this regression helps to reinforce the idea that despite any 
signalling characteristic, dividends are related to the state of maturity of a company, 
which determines the payout decision.  
 These tests appear as a preliminary inference, as still any evidence regarding the 
chased consistent maturity sign of dividends is presented. 
The first models to infer about the possible signal released by dividend decision 
are constructed including as dependent variable in a Logistic procedure the change 
towards a lower MVBV level, in a binary mode; this indicates whether a company has 
moved towards a more mature level, regardless of its actual or prior “mature state”.  
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From Logit 5
6, one can understand if the dividend payment decision influences 
the movement towards a more mature state; the results, however, show little evidence 
on this (only with 37.9% of error this can be statistically accepted).  
 
Logit 6: 
                                                 
6 ∆Qt+1 is defined as a binary variable for a NEGATIVE change in MVBV in the next period, as seen in 
Table 1.   - 15 - 
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In Logit 6 the binary variable 2YDIVUP is included instead of DORDDIVM, 
reflecting the fact that, instead of one year dividend payment, if the firm undertakes two 
consecutive years of dividend payment, this could be seen a stronger signal. Despite 
statistically significant, these results reveal that the payment of dividends in two 
consecutive years increases the MVBV, rather than approximating to some more mature 
levels. This provides somehow evidence for the earnings predictability theory instead. 
In fact, the variable is statistically acceptable within 10% of error (8.94%), confirming 
that the signal exists for firms that repeat the dividend distribution decision. However, 
when testing the same model, but using as dependent variable the change in MVBV, 
instead of a binary variable, in a OLS regression, the results are very poor (adjusted R
2 
of -0.0028); which indicates that if any signal present in the second year of dividend 
payment, this can not be measured quantitatively.  
 
Logit 7: 
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Now, instead of dummy variables for dividend or repurchase distribution, the 
quantitative changes will be used in a logistic regression. The results from Logit 7 
clearly contradict the ones previously presented. This may indicate the relevance of 
magnitude of the sign, as to be seen as a sign for maturity, the dividend should have a 
significant change. Therefore, Logit 7 clearly points out positive changes in dividends 
as an indicator for future Q levels, with a 4.88% statistic level. 
 
Logit 8:   - 16 - 
ε β β β
β β β α
+ + + +
+ ∆ + + + = ∆ ( +
f f i i t
t t t t t
INDC FYR MKTCAP




3 2 1 1  
Logit 9: 
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Following these results, one should now investigate whether dividends signal 
mature firms given their previous state regarding maturity, that is, the change in t+1 on 
MVBV given that in t this had been either classified as low or high Q
7 (under or above 
1 in the MVBV ratio). Therefore, the dependent variable  t t LOWQ Q | 1 + ∆  in Logit 8 or 
t t HIQ Q | 1 + ∆  in Logit 9 if any signal present, should be explained by dividend payment. 
Of course, this signal would have much more impact in a high Q company, if exists. 
However, this is inconsistent with current theory, as firms with high Q should have 
enough NPV projects and not pay any dividend.  
 
Logit 10: 
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The results came as expected for Logit 9, as no signal could be found in 
dividends (DORDDIVM only rejected as different from zero with 75% probability of 
error, and similar results for INIT in Logit 10 and 2YDIVPAY). Logit 8 shows a similar 
results, as DORDDIVM show no statistical significance signalling future firm state, 
given its mature state in t. Although with lower rejection levels, variables as INIT and 
2YDIVPAY were also tested instead of DORDDIVM for a similar Logit 8 model; still 
no significance was found. This confirms what has been concluded from Logit 5; 
                                                 
7 This is precisely the definition of the variables ∆Qt+1|LOWQ and ∆Qt+1|HIQ used in Logits 5,6 and 7.   - 17 - 
therefore one should now try to check if there is any signal when considering the 
quantitative change in dividends, but using the same dependent variable. 
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In Logit 11, the impact of a positive dividend change significantly (9.31% 
significance level) indicates a drift towards higher Q in the next period, given that the 
company came form a high Q level in t. This however does not apply to firms with Low 
Q levels in t (Logit 12), as the change in dividend levels does not have any statistic 
significance when to indicate future Q levels.  
  To conclude, Logit 7 clearly shows that changes in ordinary dividends 
(ORDDIVM) with odd ratio 0.172 and changes in open market repurchases 
(OMR_VM) with odd ratio 9.645 explain the change in MVBV in the next period. A 
small change in ordinary dividends is more likely to change negatively Q, whilst a high 
change in OMR_VM is more likely to lead to a negative change in Q. When analysing 
the maturity state in t to infer about Q in t+1, one can check Logit 11 and Logit 12, 
which indicate that changes in ordinary dividends and in open market repurchases only 
seem to explain a negative change in Q when a firm has high Q status in t. When a firm 
is considered low Q on period t, changes on ordinary dividends and open market 
repurchases do not seem to have any statistical significance to explain a change in Qt+1. 
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6. Robustness 
The first concern is, obviously, if firms with high Q are significantly different 
from those with low Q. The two-sample tests made show clear evidence of that, as 
MTKCAP, CASHM and all payout variables are significantly different both in the t-stat 
and w-stat. The fact that OPPROFM is not different between the two samples provides 
further consistency, as the danger of bias between mature firms and/or firms with 
available NPV projects is vanished. Hence, having operational profit levels not different 
across both samples would guarantee inexistent size bias, as mature firms could show 
higher OPPROFM, however this is not the case. 
One of the tests used to check the robustness of these results was a Logistic 
regression, included in Appendix 2, which provides evidence that a simply dividend 
payment indication does not signal decrease in Tobin’s Q ratio; this was achieved by 
excluding any other distribution method, such as repurchases, tender offers or special 
dividends. As repurchases were statistically significant when to infer about dividend 
signalling mature firms but also in many other cases, it does not possess any signalling 
power. Moreover, it represents a considerable noise, as firms seem to increase their 
distributions made through this method; also, after excluding it, the dividend payment 
indication by itself still reveals no statistic significance when considering dividend-only 
paying firms as signal for mature firms. Also Grullon et al (2002) made tests using 
dividend-only paying firms, however reached different results for different data and 
period analysis. 
The approximation made to consider a firm “mature” is, though, a major concern 
and the biggest barrier to higher robustness, as being MVBV a proxy for Tobin’s Q, and 
the latter an approximation itself for immatureness level of a firm. This explains the   - 19 - 
inclusion of CASHM
8, increasing the credibility of Q taken as a ratio to infer about a 
firm’s maturity. Another solution was to avoid not prosperous firms to bias results, by 
excluding firms with negative OPPROFM. This test check resulted in a smaller Wald 
Chi Square-test (1.1268), but still no statistical significance was found (only significant 
with a probability of 28.8%). 
 
7. Conclusions 
The first model presented in Appendix 1, replicating Vaughan and Williams’ 
(1998) model does confirm the theory of earnings predictability for dividends. This 
poses immediately the question if dividends still signal maturity. If so, the conclusions 
would reject both hypotheses, as they are mutually exclusive. 
Nevertheless, the tests made on available data allow different conclusions to be 
drawn. The first is that the UK firms and their maturity, measured by MVBV, influence 
and determine the decision to pay dividends; furthermore, cash levels also seem to 
influence specially dividend increases. This provides, therefore, full support for H1. 
However, if mature state influences dividend decisions and increases, the 
contrary is not so clear. If, in one hand, the simple decision to pay or not to pay (or 
increase or not to increase) does not seem to signal any change toward more mature 
level, by the other hand, when taken into account the magnitude of dividend change, 
this provides a significant sign for future maturity level
9 particularly for high Q firms. 
Moreover, along with the short term relations found by Grullon et al (2002) for 
systematic risk and dividends for US data, the tests here presented seem to confirm the 
consistency of a sign, given not only by the decision to pay or to increase dividends, but 
                                                 
8 As Q only points out mature firms if they have high levels of cash, otherwise, it would only indicate 
lack of available NPV projects 
9 As seen in Logit 11   - 20 - 
mainly by the amount and the context in which this decision is made. This provides 
partially support for H2, as only for high Q firms the statistic significance was found. 
As seen, only for high Q firms in t the ordinary dividend change and the open market 
repurchase explain the negative change in Qt+1. However, it should be clear that only 
dividends have signalling power, due to its stickiness characteristic, that is, the dividend 
policy is understood as not occasional, and therefore any omission is hardly penalized 
by the market, which makes the signal credible and consistent through time. Although 
high open market repurchases changes do seem to explain the change in Q, they can not 
stand as a signal as they lack cost and consistency to be credible through time to the 
market. 
Concerning the ORDDIVM variable, the fact that dividend levels were measured 
on a yearly basis, as well as MVBV, do not represent a significant argument against, as 
changes in Tobin’s Q should last longer through time; conversantly, the dividend if 
signalling this, should also be consistent even when analysing longer periods than those 
presented by Grullon et al. It is, nevertheless, possible to exist problems connected with 
either financial reports on which book values are based as well as important 
implications when analysing a whole fiscal year, although the change in Q should 
remain longer than just the period surrounding the announcement date, as the maturity 
cycle can hardly be inverted. 
The main problem is now concerning on the ambiguity of the signal. Evidence 
that dividends signal both maturity and future earnings is apparently contradictory. 
However, if considering that mature firms, despite not having new positive NPV 
projects available, this does not imply their lack of profitability. Therefore, despite the 
clear ambiguity of the signal and the empiric evidence, the results are still consistent.    - 21 - 
Tables 
 
Table 1 – Variables Description 
FYR  Fiscal Year  
INDC4   Industry code in Datastream  
MTKCAP   Market capitalization 
SFUNDS   Book value for shareholders Funds 
ORDDIVM   Yearly ordinary dividend paid scaled by MTKCAP 
DORDIVM   Binary for ORDDIVM  
OMR_VM   Yearly open market repurchases scaled by MTKCAP 
TOR_VM  Yearly tender offers scaled by MTKCAP 
SDIVM  Yearly special dividend scaled by MTKCAP 
DORM_VM   Binary for OMR_VM 
OPPROFM  Yearly operational profits scaled by MTKCAP 
∆ORDDIVM  Yearly Changes for ORDDIVM 
TOTPAYM  Total Yearly Payout Value scaled by MKTCAP 
CASHM  Yearly cash level scaled by MTKCAP 
DCASHM  Binary for CASHM increases 
OMITS   Binary for dividend omissions  
INIT   Binary for dividend initiations  
DIVUP   Binary for dividend increase from previous period 
DIVDOWN   Binary for dividend decrease from previous period 
2YDIVUP   Binary for 2 consecutive yearly dividend increase 
2YDIVDOWN  Binary for 2 consecutive yearly dividend decrease 
DIVPAY  Binary for dividend paid in the considered period 
2YDIVPAY   Binary for dividend paid in 2 consecutive years 
MVBV   MTKCAP /  SFUNDS 
HIQ   Binary for firms presenting MVBV above 1 
LOWQ   Binary for firms presenting MVBV under 1 
∆Qt 
Changes in MVBV as binary variable (1 for firms with negative and 0 for positive change in 
MVBV) 
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Table 2 – Summary Data Filtering 
 
Initial Data   13,999 
Financials -2,209 
Utilities -531 
Lost of observations due to lagged variables and database errors  -1,206 
Outliers -1,148 
Negative OPPROFM  -57 
Basic Data Sample  8,848 
 
Table 3 – Basic descriptive statistics 
   n  mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis  quartile3  median  quartile1 
MTKCAP  8848  778328.4  4333762 16.15646 348.7454 236584.5 54010.5 14213.5
SFUNDS 8848  317862.3  2928111 38.32586 1750.37 96043.5  24436.5  7673.5
ORDDIVM  8848 0.027304 0.087731 70.6882 5908.669 0.039582 0.022695  0
∆ORDDIVM 7086  0.00253  0.098087 62.06397 4796.368 0.006798  0  -0.00246
OMR_VM  8848 0.001761 0.015898 19.09226 571.7921 0  0  0
TOR_VM 8848  0.0004  0.015764 60.0529 4274.848 0 0 0
SDIVM  8848  0.001337  0.04852 55.20578 3416.586 0 0 0
TOTPAYM  8848 0.030802 0.103139 49.44068 3253 0.040525 0.023059  0
OPPROFM  8848 0.070891 0.706199 45.9497 3448.659 0.150178 0.099718  0.0419
CASHM  8848 0.155211 0.781979 57.73779 3997.024 0.15986 0.066993 0.020814
MVBV  8848 2.920514 36.95129 -4.49942 3078.357 2.850253 1.594285 0.899599
NETINCM  8848 -0.10061 1.578273 -35.4165 1602.576 0.085128  0.05413 -0.00458
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics considered by fiscal year (fyr) 
MKTCAP                         
fyr n  mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis quartile3 median quartile1 
1994  903  541684  1953469 7.63  73.25 217779 56087 16633 
1995  889  586243  2212497 8.23  85.61 223911 64418 17581 
1996  1019 604750  2425831 9.44  116.48  228806  58707 17168 
1997  1112  607342  2777155 11.05  149.87 233884 53446  16153 
1998  1107  720968  3368421 10.04  122.08 216822 49933  13545 
1999  994 965761  4531960  9.82 114.37  265461  55411  14631 
2000  967 1024914  5768218  14.16 247.21  283781  67530 13900 
2001  957 1066230  7240438  13.92 214.56  242259  43332 11371 
2002  900  905760  5607834 12.89  189.03 203619 40006  9421 
SFUNDS                         
fyr n  mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis quartile3 median quartile1 
1994  903 242026  963927 9.28 110.35  96900  23046 8415 
1995  889  263902  1152365 10.35  133.86 103844 26371  9788 
1996  1019 228047  1057178 11.1  150.21 85620 22236  7674 
1997  1112 200542  905655 10.57 138.93 76102 20925  6451 
1998  1107 211849  1082210  14.86 292.14 82600 21603  6392 
1999  994 282987  1329090  11.89  190.92  91121  25305 7111 
2000  967 481727  4904720  25.37 705.2  111502  30014 8279 
2001  957  503834  5114555 24.98  685.68 114926 30003  8393 
2002  900 488999  4758986  23.9 632.06  118550  27466 7336 
ORDDIVM                         
fyr n  mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis quartile3 median quartile1 
1994  903  0.027074 0.02748  7.77  109.97  0.036349  0.025907 0.01408 
1995 889  0.030202  0.02303  3.93  41.46  0.04048  0.02931  0.017365 
1996 1019  0.025325  0.0254  3.88 34.12  0.036559  0.02427  0.003137 
1997  1112  0.026558 0.06385  24.57  726.44  0.038511 0.02336  0 
1998 1107  0.027935  0.03536  3.62 25.65  0.043461  0.021457 0 
1999 994  0.026188  0.04448  8.69  120.93  0.040308  0.018044  0 
2000 967  0.033149  0.24223  30.13  926.6  0.042697  0.013793  0 
2001  957  0.024391 0.03099  3.53  36.85  0.039844 0.01561  0 
2002 900  0.025104  0.02886  1.48 3.56  0.041776  0.019063  0 
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics considered by fiscal year (continued) 
∆ORDDIVM                         
fyr n  mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis quartile3 median quartile1 
1994 0               
1995 817  0.003299  0.01919  -11.28  235.71  0.009385  0.001889  -0.00145 
1996 838  -0.000703  0.01563  1.32  30.72  0.003774  -0.000011  -0.005283 
1997 955  0.004015  0.05703  25.18  719.39  0.006408  0  -0.001363 
1998 1003  0.003988  0.06635  -23.45  698.24  0.00959 0  -0.000058 
1999 923  -0.001338  0.03964  1.69  98.97  0.00448  0  -0.004731 
2000 845  0.01015  0.26167  27.57  788.79  0.00932  0  -0.001218 
2001 862  0.000221  0.02182  -1.26  25.68  0.004513  0  -0.00331 
2002 843  0.000538  0.02212  -1.32  33.92  0.00485  0  -0.002036 
OMR_VM                         
fyr n  mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis quartile3 median quartile1 
1994 903  0  0      0  0  0 
1995 889  0.000267  0.00412  21.36  510.12 0  0  0 
1996  1019  0.000862  0.0098 14.39 232.48  0  0  0 
1997 1112  0.00126  0.01536  20.43  505.66  0  0  0 
1998 1107  0.002231  0.0154  9.84  116.16  0  0  0 
1999 994  0.00252  0.02474  23.02  628.77 0  0  0 
2000 967  0.00361  0.02354  10.3  123.58 0  0  0 
2001 957  0.002821  0.0165  8.62  92.81 0  0  0 
2002 900  0.002115  0.01432  9.43  101.11 0  0  0 
TOR_VM                         
fyr n  mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis quartile3 median quartile1 
1994 903  0  0      0  0  0 
1995 889  0  0      0  0  0 
1996 1019  0  0      0  0  0 
1997 1112  0  0      0  0  0 
1998 1107  0.000059  0.00196  33.27 1107  0  0  0 
1999 994  0.000861  0.01784  24.47  648.78 0  0  0 
2000 967  0.000831  0.01558  19.73  399.26 0  0  0 
2001 957  0.001631  0.041  28.28  830.34 0  0  0 
2002 900  0.000285  0.00615  22.29  509.9 0  0  0 
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics considered by fiscal year (continued) 
SDIVM                         
fyr n  mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis quartile3 median quartile1 
1994  903  0 0      0 0 0 
1995  889  0.000061  0.00183  29.82  889  0 0 0 
1996  1019  0.000081  0.0019  24.74  637.28  0 0 0 
1997  1112  0.000994  0.02281  30.75  987.72  0 0 0 
1998  1107  0.000637  0.01261  23.06  564.99  0 0 0 
1999  994  0.003324  0.07121  29.04  879.14  0 0 0 
2000  967  0.003032  0.05823  25.15  679.85  0 0 0 
2001  957  0.000069  0.00184  29.78  904.25  0 0 0 
2002  900  0.003979  0.11424  29.91  896.2  0 0 0 
TOTPAYM                         
fyr n  mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis quartile3 median quartile1 
1994  903  0.027074 0.02748  7.77  109.97  0.036349  0.025907 0.01408 
1995 889  0.03053  0.02351  3.81 38.4  0.040887  0.029548  0.017365 
1996  1019  0.026268 0.02795  3.9  28.97  0.036939  0.024375 0.00337 
1997  1112  0.028813 0.06984  20.02  516.41  0.038814 0.02362  0 
1998 1107  0.030861  0.04221  3.56 20.26  0.045056  0.021991 0 
1999 994  0.032893  0.09176  16.19  357.33  0.042633  0.018445  0 
2000 967  0.040622  0.25076  27.39  805.03  0.046253  0.015412  0 
2001  957  0.028911 0.05533  12.48  254.17  0.042238 0.01598  0 
2002  900  0.031483 0.11832  26.32  753.68  0.043566 0.01998  0 
OPPROFM                         
fyr n  mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis quartile3 median quartile1 
1994  903  0.125287 0.59048  17.06  323.83  0.129432  0.098229 0.06947 
1995  889  0.159487  1.8233  26.5  760.3  0.144373 0.108721 0.078652 
1996  1019  0.102495 0.44201  15.59  338.95  0.133281 0.10085 0.065971 
1997  1112  0.096812  0.18693  -6.56  139.38  0.149749 0.106122 0.062723 
1998  1107  0.090557 0.24271  -5.76  88.6  0.176004 0.11378 0.057593 
1999  994  0.074386 0.26514  -10.9  199.56  0.164991 0.09643 0.034829 
2000 967  0.058804  0.21322  -3.3 25.15  0.164884  0.079324  -0.002345 
2001 957  -0.006571  0.37651  -3.64  26.22  0.154631  0.075972  -0.029444 
2002 900  -0.071699  0.78743  -8.58  126.96  0.149679  0.09212  -0.058716 
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Table 4 – Descriptive statistics considered by fiscal year (continued) 
CASHM                         
fyr n mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis quartile3  median  quartile1 
1994 903  0.208413 1.97789  28.97  858.39 0.158637  0.071864  0.020827 
1995 889  0.183061 1.19983  26.19  738.25 0.156118  0.068095  0.018389 
1996 1019  0.124239 0.31428  11.59  185.85 0.133123  0.056816  0.016198 
1997 1112  0.117813 0.18038  4.57  31.02  0.140786  0.064277  0.019363 
1998 1107  0.136018 0.20596  3.79  21.31  0.169207  0.069652  0.020039 
1999 994  0.119385 0.18496  3.73  20.23 0.138517  0.055214  0.018657 
2000 967  0.129250 0.22091  7.43  104.29 0.150540  0.062630  0.020528 
2001 957  0.171485 0.31658  6.65  74.52 0.189215  0.076455  0.025340 
2002 900  0.229362 0.50471  8.24  93.77 0.237008  0.093874  0.033689 
MVBV                         
fyr n mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis quartile3  median  quartile1 
1994 903  4.996264  71.45490 29.32  872.48 2.723987  1.737705  1.048035 
1995 889  2.287914 5.23139  8.19  119.59 2.539243  1.603139  0.973203 
1996 1019  3.296608 27.01961  28.36  874.50 2.853356  1.748308  1.068613 
1997 1112  2.933767 9.89415  8.00  178.02 3.084327  1.741532  1.038082 
1998 1107  3.704723 17.38758  14.44  282.67 3.204546  1.637307  0.874936 
1999 994  2.928541  12.60891  -2.42  116.51 3.400708  1.603604  0.897609 
2000 967  0.867482  75.55250 -30.37  937.47 3.551776  1.717773  0.887337 
2001 957  3.066145  23.14390 27.81  824.11 2.406482  1.348545  0.776523 
2002 900  2.098094 8.81033  15.36  293.64 2.047285  1.134337  0.657767 
NETINCM                         
fyr n mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis quartile3  median  quartile1 
1994 903  -0.123465  3.00047  -27.21  782.76 0.075811  0.058609  0.033513 
1995 889  -0.128259  2.91634  -20.42  425.81 0.086018  0.065952  0.039229 
1996 1019  -0.004790 0.65552  -9.40  186.73 0.080739  0.058776  0.026245 
1997 1112  0.022162 0.28970  -5.82  95.09  0.088752  0.061249  0.025831 
1998 1107  -0.020667 0.42450  -8.80  115.77 0.102305  0.062050  0.013283 
1999 994  -0.024550  0.53032  -15.65  338.89 0.096124  0.052486  -0.003001 
2000 967  -0.062393  0.51554  -8.87  109.68 0.088590  0.034086  -0.029531 
2001 957  -0.190798  0.87245  -11.23  199.52 0.075829  0.021846  -0.117357 
2002 900  -0.438053  2.16631  -11.17  160.46 0.071923  0.022964  -0.204374 
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Table 5 – Descriptive statistics by Industry for ORDDIVM 
ORDDIVM                         
INDC4 n  mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis quartile3  median  quartile1 
AERSP  128 0.032081 0.0135278 0.667059 1.0310648 0.0404235 0.0303618 0.0225945
AUTMB  219 0.0436934 0.0294758 0.758869 0.4740706 0.0592891 0.0386508 0.0233155
BEVES  90 0.0358506 0.0207019 0.5087483 0.4353191 0.0462529 0.0328466 0.0254852
CHMCL  245 0.03975 0.0426236 4.3823886 26.613872 0.0456201 0.0352954 0.0244596
CNSBM  758 0.0388628 0.0759068 21.143418 521.15194 0.0476384 0.0350923 0.0231193
DIVIN 65 0.0489472  0.09121 7.1782995 55.547628 0.0598055  0.0375729  0.021447
ELTNC  413 0.0296579 0.0419374 6.1598453 57.735038 0.0384611 0.0216396 0.0019797
ENGEN  664 0.0479086  0.290079 25.426205 652.21042 0.0500026 0.0351746 0.0208377
FDRET 129 0.0241065  0.0188261 0.2706525 -0.5228775 0.0368155  0.0267102  0
FOODS 301 0.0373164  0.0316576 3.4300177 30.379681 0.0521921  0.0363487 0.0185613
FSTPA 42 0.0317209  0.0246934 0.6909129 0.9174793 0.0423829  0.0326132  0.012974
HHOLD 567 0.0371503  0.0433223 7.5425079 96.660608 0.0521915  0.0329003 0.0123416
HLTHC 252 0.0123874  0.0175668 -1.4821246 16.685208 0.0247612  0.0084312  0
INFOH 144 0.0127931  0.0184659 1.4845857 1.5115894 0.0234634  0.0019158  0
LESUR 764 0.0204203  0.0240518 1.5262883 3.2582119 0.0342505  0.0137325  0
MEDIA 746 0.0188218  0.0283252 4.6062731 31.838975 0.0269851  0.013048  0
MNING 105 0.0264261  0.0388579 2.8617653 10.429119 0.0375517  0.020715  0
OILGS 156 0.0170423  0.023876 3.4718624 21.181548 0.0272365  0.0104026  0
PERSH  60 0.0372063 0.0304164 0.7753439 1.1630679 0.0524203 0.0353494 0.0181659
PHARM  235 0.007251  0.018027 4.7067935 34.264237 0.0013106 0 0
RTAIL 494 0.0249408  0.0257047 2.8955733 20.23885 0.0354773  0.0225535  0
SFTCS  665 0.0082632  0.0180591 6.8703544 87.590136 0.0095578 0 0
STLOM 57 0.0388239  0.0648273 5.1147086 32.893902 0.0521548  0.0292341  0
SUPSV 1064 0.0234517  0.0252795 2.1182634 12.388838 0.0371259  0.0185885  0
TELCM 127 0.0062407  0.0117047 2.1032684 3.9827684 0.0088382 0 0
TOBAC  22 0.0493827 0.0162877 -0.8193746 3.8274388 0.0561142 0.0506437 0.0406485
TRNSP  336 0.031747 0.0296137 3.7978082 40.695308 0.0451821 0.0287868 0.0182889
 
AERSP=Aerospace & Defence; AUTMB=Automobiles & Parts; BEVES=Beverages; CHMCL=Chemicals; CNSBM=Construction & 
Building Materials; DIVIN=Diversified Industrials  ; ELTNC=Electronic & Electrical Equipment; ENGEN=Engineering & Machinery; 
FDRET=Food & Drug Retailers; FOODS=Food Producers & Processors; FSTPA=Forestry & Paper; HHOLD=Household Goods & 
Textiles; HLTHC=Health; INFOH=Information Technology Hardware; LESUR=Leisure & Hotels; MEDIA=Media & Entertainment; 
MNING=Mining ; OILGS=Oil & Gas; PERSH=Personal Care & Household Products; PHARM=Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology; 
RTAIL=Retailers General; SFTCS=Software & Computer Services; STLOM=Steel & Other Metals; SUPSV=Support Services; 
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Table 5 – Descriptive statistics by Industry for OMR_VM (continued) 
OMR_VM                        
INDC4 n  mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis  quartile3  median quartile1 
AERSP 128 0.0002823  0.003194 11.313708 128 0 0  0
AUTMB 219 0.0020275  0.0120883 7.0931752 52.209025 0 0 0
BEVES 90 0.0019875  0.0099569 5.2567431 26.571301 0 0  0
CHMCL 245 0.0009677  0.0079228 8.7439451 76.942989 0 0 0
CNSBM 758 0.0026444  0.0157742 7.2236323 57.783657 0 0 0
DIVIN  65 0 0    0 0 0
ELTNC 413 0.0028663  0.0157829 6.5664865 46.254426 0 0 0
ENGEN 664 0.0039799  0.0256936 9.4221537 101.56922 0 0  0
FDRET 129 0.0057984  0.0412242 8.7210952 81.919842 0 0  0
FOODS 301 0.0013494  0.0070982 6.3727735 42.836361 0 0  0
FSTPA  42 0 0    0 0 0
HHOLD 567 0.0026605  0.0312131 19.892625 435.48322 0 0 0
HLTHC 252 0.0003508  0.0049357 15.466532 242.58586 0 0  0
INFOH 144 0.0008314  0.0055434 8.6087202 82.487803 0 0  0
LESUR 764 0.0016615  0.0161721 14.117467 226.35728 0 0  0
MEDIA 746 0.0002086  0.0024714 15.641751 263.49247 0 0  0
MNING 105 0.0041777  0.0230886 6.4566007 42.714987 0 0  0
OILGS 156 0.0007852  0.0046297 7.7661834 65.714361 0 0  0
PERSH  60 0 0    0 0 0
PHARM 235 0.0007441  0.0056913 11.009311 137.24635 0 0 0
RTAIL 494 0.0011429  0.0083094 11.395367 148.71966 0 0  0
SFTCS 665 0.0005579  0.0070797 17.104722 333.44856 0 0  0
STLOM 57 0.0013119  0.0089577 7.4189105 55.564059 0 0  0
SUPSV 1064 0.0014842  0.0136737 13.087231 203.34327 0 0 0
TELCM 127 0.001523  0.0171633 11.269428 127 0 0 0
TOBAC 22 0.0053223  0.0155858 3.1165669 9.3611291 0 0  0
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Table 5 – Descriptive statistics by Industry for TOTPAYM (continued) 
TOTPAYM                         
INDC4 n  mean stdev skewness  kurtosis  quartile3  median  quartile1 
AERSP  128 0.0323633  0.013298 0.7198424 1.0764065 0.0404235 0.0304672 0.0226643
AUTMB  219  0.059733 0.1601129 12.289932 164.89575 0.0613886 0.0406816 0.0247478
BEVES  90 0.0378381 0.0225115 0.4933451 0.0403075 0.0503221  0.033975 0.0254852
CHMCL  245 0.0440141 0.0628326 7.3591132 72.521189 0.0457204  0.035594 0.0246471
CNSBM  758 0.0451256 0.0993925 15.024619 263.26251 0.0496258 0.0356369 0.0234797
DIVIN 65  0.0489472  0.09121 7.1782995 55.547628 0.0598055  0.0375729  0.021447
ELTNC 413  0.0327408  0.0477079 5.3174316 44.052031 0.0401018 0.0218288 0.0031694
ENGEN  664 0.0551231 0.2957998 24.02447 601.05256 0.0527575 0.0357858 0.0214449
FDRET  129 0.0299049 0.0479782 6.4558122 52.494252 0.0368155 0.0267102  0
FOODS  301 0.0398659 0.0364114 3.1659061 21.109818 0.0537172  0.03755 0.0185613
FSTPA  42 0.0317209 0.0246934 0.6909129 0.9174793 0.0423829 0.0326132  0.012974
HHOLD  567 0.0459456 0.1519777 19.801094 434.10962 0.0539901 0.0332491 0.0129817
HLTHC  252 0.0135945 0.0171188 1.7872753 5.5324868 0.024844 0.0085685  0
INFOH  144 0.0140771 0.0214314 2.1911399 7.2960757 0.0243225 0.0025189  0
LESUR  764 0.0227913 0.0331318 4.0644473 29.369855 0.0349043 0.0141403  0
MEDIA  746 0.0190304 0.0284186 4.556489 31.281565 0.0270107 0.0132832  0
MNING 105  0.0306038  0.0507541 3.3650892 14.135018 0.0378664  0.020715  0
OILGS  156 0.0181879 0.0256073 3.1643133 16.571485 0.0280435 0.0104026  0
PERSH  60 0.0380816  0.029506 0.8800896 1.352419 0.0524203 0.0353494 0.0219089
PHARM  235  0.0079952  0.0200369 4.3996603 27.266503 0.0013106 0 0
RTAIL  494 0.0263785 0.0288535 2.9753296 17.349222 0.0366302 0.0231939  0
SFTCS  665  0.0088345  0.0198037 6.2310366 66.166086 0.0102404 0 0
STLOM 57  0.0401357  0.064818 5.0631273 32.473577 0.052356  0.0306868  0
SUPSV  1064 0.0258773 0.0354887 5.6419371 60.532395 0.0387599 0.0190806  0
TELCM 127  0.0083879  0.0239669 6.2146685 47.611062 0.0088382 0 0
TOBAC  22  0.054705 0.0260462 1.2288649 3.4807288 0.0608982 0.0525028 0.0406485
TRNSP  336 0.0360185 0.0384953 4.4841791 33.97843 0.0479258 0.0294514 0.0184056
 
 
Table 6 – Frequency Count for firms by Fiscal Year 
   Table of hiq by fyr 
  fyr(fyr) Total
     1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002   
Frequency  low Q  212 196 244 311 268 273 322 376  2202
overall %     2.99 2.77 3.44 4.39 3.78 3.85 4.54 5.31 31.1
yearly % for low Q     9.63 8.9 11.1 14.1 12.2 12.4 14.6 17.1   
% per year     26 23.4 25.6 31 29 32.3 37.4 44.6   
Frequency  high Q  605 642 711 692 655 572 540 467  4884
overall %     8.54 9.06 10 9.77 9.24 8.07 7.62 6.59 68.9
yearly % for high Q     12.4 13.1 14.6 14.2 13.4 11.7 11.1 9.56   
% per year     74.1 76.6 74.5 69 71 67.7 62.7 55.4   
 817 838 955 1003 923 845 862  843  7086
 
 Total  
11.5 11.8 13.5 14.2 13 11.9 12.2 11.9  100
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Table 7 – Descriptive statistics for ORDDIVM by high and low Q 
   n  mean  stdev  skewness  kurtosis  quartile3  median  quartile1 
Low Q  2202 0.037313  0.059587 16.35411 480.8866 0.055661  0.032508  0
High Q  4884 0.025721  0.109137 65.26246 4455.447 0.036644  0.023148  0.00198
 
 
Table 8 – Results for Two Sample T-Test 
Variable  t Value F Value Pr > F
MTKCAP -6.44 2.25 <.0001
TOTPAY -4.37 3.26 <.0001
ORDDIVM 4.68 3.35 <.0001
OMR_VM 5.13 4.52 <.0001
CASHM 12.6 24.61 <.0001
OPPROFM 0.28 61.96 <.0001
 
 
Table 9 – Results for Two Sample W-Test 
 
   Std Dev Mean Kruskal-Wallis Test 
      N Under H0 Score   Pr > Chi-Square 
MTKCAP  high Q  4,884 79,696.10 4,050.04     
   low Q  2,202 79,696.10 2,419.99  <.0001
TOTPAY  high Q  4,884 78,920.74 3,804.13   
   low Q  2,203 78,920.74 2,967.30  <.0001
ORDDIVM  high Q  4,884 78,871.58 3,390.48   
   low Q  2,202 78,871.58 3,882.90  <.0001
OMR_VM  high Q  4,884 28,199.31 3,525.46   
   low Q  2,202 28,199.31 3,583.61  0.0017
CASHM  high Q  4,884 79,693.82 3,336.82   
   low Q  2,202 79,693.82 4,001.91  <.0001
OMITS  high Q  4,884 24,666.82 3,495.42   
   low Q  2,202 24,666.82 3,650.15  <.0001
INIT  high Q  4,884 26,332.52 3,544.43   
   low Q  2,202 26,332.52 3,541.44  0.8631
2YDIVPAY  high Q  4,884 64043.00 3,649.14     
   low Q  2,203 64043.00 3,310.91  <.0001
OPPROFM  high Q  4,884 79,696.10 3,319.20     
   low Q  2,202 79,696.10 4,040.99  <.0001
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Value  DIVPAYt+1  Frequency
1  1 4141 
2  0 1360 
Number of 
Observations  5501    
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square  DF  Pr  >  ChiSq
Likelihood Ratio  2038.4917 36  <.0001 
Score  1706.4341 36  <.0001 
Wald  1067.6906 36  <.0001 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates  Odds Ratio Estimates 
Standard Wald 95%  Wald 
Parameter Estimate Error 
Chi-
Square  Pr > ChiSq
Point 
Estimate Confidence Limits 
Intercept  -7.8432  0.4245  341.3561  <.0001          
LOWQt 0.5136  0.096  28.631  <.0001  1.671  1.385  2.017 
DCASHMt -0.1954  0.1594  1.5032  0.2202  0.822  0.602  1.124 
∆OPPROFt -0.0159  0.0519  0.0943 0.7588  0.984  0.889 1.09 
log(MTKCAPt) 0.8097  0.0298  738.609  <.0001  2.247  2.12  2.382 
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3 2 1 1  
 
Response Profile 
Ordered Value  LOWQt 
Total 
Frequency
1  1 1800
2  0 3701
Number of Observations  5501    
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square Pr  >  ChiSq
Likelihood Ratio  1083.8935 <.0001
Score  986.5481 <.0001
Wald  801.4503 <.0001
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates  Odds Ratio Estimates 
Parameter Estimate  Standard Wald 95%  Wald 







Intercept  4.2320  0.2896 213.5047 <.0001         
DORDDIVMt 0.3523  0.0870 16.4183 <.0001 1.422 1.199  1.687 
DORM_VMt 0.4189  0.1551 7.3005 0.0069 1.520 1.122  2.060 
∆OPPROFMt 0.0331  0.0494 0.4494 0.5026 1.034 0.938  1.139 
log(MTKCAPt) -0.4150  0.0205 410.8440 <.0001 0.660 0.634  0.687 
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Value  DCASHMt+1  Frequency
1  1 2809 
2  0 2575 
Number of 
Observations  5384    
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test 
Chi-
Square  DF Pr  >  ChiSq
Likelihood Ratio  124.7387 36  <.0001 
Score  123.4808 36  <.0001 
Wald  120.8150 36  <.0001 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates  Odds Ratio Estimates 
Standard Wald 95%  Wald 
Parameter Estimate  Error 
Chi-
Square  Pr > ChiSq
Point 
Estimate Confidence Limits 
Intercept  0.4259  0.2356  3.2675  0.0707          
DORDDIVMt 0.1102  0.0773  2.0347  0.1537  1.117  0.960  1.299 
DORM_VMt -0.4271 0.1405  9.2351  0.0024  0.652  0.495  0.859 
∆OPPROFt 0.00598  0.0408  0.0215  0.8834  1.006  0.929  1.090 
log(MTKCAPt) 0.0166  0.0158  1.0979  0.2947  1.017  0.986  1.049 
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Value  DIVUPt+1  Frequency 
1  1 2397 
2  0 3905 
Number of 
Observations  6302    
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test 
Chi-
Square DF  Pr  >  ChiSq
Likelihood 
Ratio  945.5260 38  <.0001 
Score  763.5340 38  <.0001 
 










Estimate  Confidence Limits 
Intercept  -0.6993  0.2514  7.7369  0.0054          
LOWQt  0.3909  0.068 33.0362  <.0001 1.478 1.294 1.689 
∆OPPROFt  1.9219  0.3218  35.6661  <.0001 6.834 3.637 12.84 
(LOWQt).(∆OPPROFt) -2.0374  0.3567  32.627  <.0001  0.13  0.065  0.262 
log(MTKCAPt)  0.2284  0.0156  213.1114  <.0001 1.257 1.219 1.296 
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3 2 1 1  
 
Response Profile 
Ordered Qt+1 Total 
Value     Frequency 
1  1 3082 
2  0 2303 
Number of 
Observations  5385    
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square  Pr  >  ChiSq
Likelihood Ratio  254.3457 <.0001
Score  245.8387 <.0001
Wald  236.9182 <.0001
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates  Odds Ratio Estimates 
Parameter Estimate  Standard Wald Pr>ChiSq Point 95%  Wald 





Intercept  -0.4157  0.2400 3.0002 0.0833         
DORDDIVMt -0.0696  0.0791 0.7739 0.3790 0.933 0.799  1.089 
DORM_Vt -0.6993  0.1414 24.4617 <.0001 0.497 0.377  0.656 
∆OPPROFMt 0.3784  0.1445 6.8603 0.0088 1.460 1.100  1.938 
log(MTKCAPt) 0.0851 0.0162 27.4145 <.0001 1.089 1.055  1.124 
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Value  ∆Qt+1  Frequency
1  1 3082 
2  0 2303 
Number of 
Observations  5385    
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square  DF  Pr  >  ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio  256.4618 36  <.0001 
Score  247.8335 36  <.0001 
Wald  238.7131 36  <.0001 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates  Odds Ratio Estimates 
Standard Wald 95%  Wald 
Parameter Estimate  Error 
Chi-
Square  Pr > ChiSq
Point 
Estimate Confidence Limits 
Intercept  -0.4503  0.2412  3.4859  0.0619          
2YDIVPAYt -0.1284 0.0756 2.8857  0.0894  0.879  0.758  1.020 
DORM_VMt -0.6932 0.1413  24.0610 <.0001  0.500  0.379  0.660 
∆OPPROFt 0.3790  0.1446  6.8647 0.0088  1.461 1.100 1.940 
log(MTKCAPt) 0.0913  0.0164 30.9384  <.0001  1.096  1.061  1.131 
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Value  ∆Qt+1  Frequency
1  1 3081 
2  0 2303 
Number of 
Observations  5384    
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test 
Chi-
Square DF  Pr  >  ChiSq
Likelihood 
Ratio  237.8093 36 <.0001 
Score  228.6658 36 <.0001 
Wald  220.5839 36 <.0001 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates  Odds Ratio Estimates 
Standard Wald 95%  Wald 
Parameter Estimate Error 
Chi-
Square  Pr > ChiSq
Point 
Estimate Confidence Limits 
Intercept  -0.3776  0.2391  2.4946  0.1142          
∆ORDDIVMt -1.7594  0.893  3.8814  0.0488  0.172  0.03  0.991 
∆OMR_VMt 2.2665 1.2391  3.3455  0.0674  9.645  0.85  109.416 
∆OPPROFt 0.3962  0.1465 7.3123  0.0068  1.486 1.115 1.981 
log(MTKCAPt) 0.0717  0.0147  23.8972  <.0001  1.074  1.044  1.106 
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LOWQt  Total 
Value   Frequency 
1  1 664 
2  0 828 
Number of 
Observations  1492    
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test Chi-Square  DF  Pr  >  ChiSq 
Likelihood Ratio  71.7940 36  0.0004 
Score  69.6423 36  0.0006 
Wald  65.7741 36  0.0018 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates  Odds Ratio Estimates 
Standard Wald 95%  Wald 
Parameter Estimate  Error Chi-Square  Pr > ChiSq
Point 
Estimate Confidence Limits 
Intercept  -0.4636  0.5131  0.8165  0.3662          
DORDDIVMt -0.0524 0.1405  0.1391  0.7091  0.949  0.72  1.25 
DORM_VMt -0.3981 0.2317  2.9518  0.0858  0.672  0.426  1.058 
∆OPPROFt 0.182  0.1848 0.9701  0.3246  1.2  0.835  1.723 
log(MTKCAPt) 0.0279  0.0363  0.5892  0.4427  1.028  0.958  1.104 
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Value  ∆Qt+1 | HIQt  Frequency 
1  1 2418 
2  0 1475 
Number of 
Observations  3893    
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test 
Chi-
Square Pr  >  ChiSq
Likelihood Ratio  249.6751 <.0001 
Score  244.8613 <.0001 
Wald  228.8953 <.0001 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates  Odds Ratio Estimates 
Standard Wald  Pr >   Point  95% Wald 
Parameter Estimate Error ChiSq ChiSq  Estimate Confidence Limits 
Intercept  0.9363 0.3006 9.6998 0.0018             
DORDDIVMt  0.0317 0.1001 0.1002 0.7516  1.032  0.848  1.256 
DORM_VMt  -0.7293  0.1854  15.4801  <.0001  0.482 0.335 0.693 
∆OPPROFt  0.4009 0.2279 3.0942 0.0786  1.493  0.955  2.334 
log(MTKCAPt)  0.00293  0.0206 0.0203 0.8866  1.003  0.963  1.044 
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Value  ∆Qt+1 | HIQt  Frequency 
1  1 2418 
2  0 1475 
Number of 
Observations  3893    
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test 
Chi-
Square DF  Pr  >  ChiSq
Likelihood Ratio  234.7610 35  <.0001 
Score  230.6670 35  <.0001 
Wald  216.0088 35  <.0001 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates  Odds Ratio Estimates 
Standard Wald 95%  Wald 
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Square Pr>ChiSq
Point 
Estimate Confidence Limits
Intercept  0.9473  0.3004  9.9414  0.0016          
INITt 0.0853  0.1843  0.2141  0.6436  1.089  0.759  1.563 
∆OPPROFt 0.3921  0.2271 2.9803 0.0843  1.480 0.948  2.310 
log(MTKCAPt) -0.00185  0.0185  0.0100  0.9203  0.998  0.963  1.035 
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Value  ∆Qt+1|HIQt  Frequency
1  1 2418 
2  0 1475 
Number of 
Observations  3893    
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test 
Chi-
Square DF  Pr  >  ChiSq
Likelihood 
Ratio  252.7216 36 <.0001 
Score  244.3829 36 <.0001 
Wald  227.3852 36 <.0001 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates  Odds Ratio Estimates 
Standard Wald 95%  Wald 
Parameter Estimate  Error Chi-Square  Pr>ChiSq 
Point 
Estimate  Confidence Limits 
Intercept  1.0050  0.3000  11.2246  0.0008          
∆ORDDIVMt -3.0702 1.8285  2.8194  0.0931  0.046  0.001  1.671 
∆OMR_VMt 8.3463 2.5018  11.1300  0.0008  >999.999  31.278  >999.999
∆OPPROFt 0.4628  0.2403  3.7090  0.0541  1.588  0.992 2.544 
log(MTKCAPt) -0.00571  0.0184  0.0960  0.7567  0.994  0.959  1.031   - 42 - 
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Value  ∆Qt+1|LOWQt  Frequency 
1  1 663 
2  0 828 
Number of 
Observations  1491    
 
Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
Test 
Chi-
Square DF  Pr  >  ChiSq
Likelihood 
Ratio  70.4522 37  0.0007 
Score  68.4425 37  0.0013 
Wald  . 36  . 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates  Odds Ratio Estimates 
Standard Wald 95%  Wald 
Parameter Estimate Error Chi-Sq  Pr>ChiSq
Point 
Estimate Confidence Limits 
Intercept -0.2027  0.5106  0.1576  0.6913       
∆ORDDIVMt -0.7625  0.9531  0.6401  0.4237  0.467  0.072  3.021 
∆OMR_VMt -1.1535 1.5116  0.5823  0.4454  0.316  0.016  6.105 
∆OPPROFt 0.1735 0.1829 0.9000 0.3428  1.189  0.831  1.702 
log(MTKCAPt)  0.0222 0.0336 0.4377 0.5083  1.022  0.957  1.092 
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ε β β β
β β β β
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OPPROFM VM OMR ORDDIVM OPPROFM t t  
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Standard
Variable  Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept  -0.09426 0.03697 -2.55 0.0108
∆ORDDIVMtt  0.16857 0.09712 1.74 0.0827
∆OMR_VMt  0.31542 0.17809 1.77 0.0766
∆OPPROFMt  -0.89824 0.00654 -137.42 <.0001
log(MKTCAPt)  0.00281 0.00224 1.25 0.2112
d1994  0 . . .
d1995  0.07152 0.01687 4.24 <.0001
d1996  0.09186 0.01688 5.44 <.0001
d1997  0.09745 0.01646 5.92 <.0001
d1998  0.0669 0.01647 4.06 <.0001
d1999  0.07179 0.01679 4.28 <.0001
d2000  0.03472 0.01684 2.06 0.0392
d2001  0 . . .
d2002  0 . . .
dAERSP  0.00332 0.04024 0.08 0.9342
dAUTMB  0.00625 0.03458 0.18 0.8565
dBEVES  0.00732 0.04707 0.16 0.8764
dCHMCL  -0.01312 0.03364 -0.39 0.6967
dCNSBM  0.01747 0.02618 0.67 0.5045
dDIVIN  -0.01246 0.0564 -0.22 0.8252
dELTNC  -0.01769 0.02965 -0.6 0.5507
dENGEN  -0.00197 0.02673 -0.07 0.9412
dFDRET  -0.00323 0.04179 -0.08 0.9384
dFOODS  0.00914 0.03152 0.29 0.7719
dFSTPA  -0.02104 0.06398 -0.33 0.7423
dHHOLD  -0.02493 0.02823 -0.88 0.3773
dHLTHC  -0.0219 0.03399 -0.64 0.5193
dINFOH  -0.17314 0.04113 -4.21 <.0001
dLESUR  -0.00557 0.02649 -0.21 0.8334
dMEDIA  -0.01273 0.02663 -0.48 0.6328
dMNING  0.0257 0.04648 0.55 0.5804
dOILGS  0.0039 0.03967 0.1 0.9217
dPERSH 
-
0.00036312 0.05455 -0.01 0.9947
dPHARM  -0.05229 0.03487 -1.5 0.1338
dRTAIL  -0.01373 0.02882 -0.48 0.6337
dSFTCS  -0.09643 0.02774 -3.48 0.0005
dSTLOM  -0.30134 0.05775 -5.22 <.0001
dSUPSV  -0.00149 0.02513 -0.06 0.9527
dTELCM  -0.16413 0.04443 -3.69 0.0002
dTOBAC  -0.00545 0.08671 -0.06 0.9499
dTRNSP  0 . . .
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Analysis of Variance 
Sum of Mean
Source DF  Squares Square F Value Pr > F 
Model  36 1995.73149 55.43699 527.92 <.0001 
Error  5463 573.66999 0.10501      
Corrected Total  5499  2569.40148      
         
Root MSE  0.32405  R-Square  0.7767   
Dependent Mean  -0.01953  Adj R-Sq  0.7753   
Coeff Var  -1659.23764         
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MTKCAP OPPROFM DORDDIVM LOWQ Q t t t  
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates  Odds Ratio Estimates 
Standard Wald 95% Wald 
Parameter Estimate  Error
Chi-
Square Pr > ChiSq
Point 
Estimate Confidence Limits 
Intercept  -0.4295  0.2482 2.9958 0.0835    
DORDDIV  -0.0755 0.0799 0.8917 0.3450 0.927 0.793  1.085 
∆OPPROFt  0.3791 0.1455 6.7893 0.0092 1.461 1.099  1.943 
log(MKTCAPt)  0.0865 0.0167 26.8235 <.0001 1.090 1.055  1.127 
d1994  0  . . .    
d1995  -1.0355 0.1125 84.6942 <.0001 0.355 0.285  0.443 
d1996  -0.3905 0.1116 12.2317 0.0005 0.677 0.544  0.842 
d1997  -0.1988 0.1097 3.2821 0.0700 0.820 0.661  1.016 
d1998  -0.4155 0.1099 14.2967 0.0002 0.660 0.532  0.819 
d1999  -0.0648 0.1137 0.3243 0.5690 0.937 0.750  1.171 
d2000  0.1302 0.1162 1.2549 0.2626 1.139 0.907  1.431 
d2001  0  . . .    
d2002  0  . . .    
dAERSP  0.1271 0.2609 0.2372 0.6262 1.136 0.681  1.894 
dAUTMB  0.1177 0.2260 0.2712 0.6025 1.125 0.722  1.752 
dBEVES  -0.1588 0.3106 0.2613 0.6092 0.853 0.464  1.568 
dCHMCL  -0.1560 0.2180 0.5119 0.4743 0.856 0.558  1.312 
dCNSBM  -0.0137 0.1731 0.0063 0.9368 0.986 0.703  1.385 
dDIVIN  0.7360 0.3808 3.7358 0.0533 2.088 0.990  4.403 
dELTNC  0.2688 0.1984 1.8360 0.1754 1.308 0.887  1.930 
dENGEN  0.5182 0.1800 8.2924 0.0040 1.679 1.180  2.389 
dFDRET  0.1555 0.2806 0.3073 0.5793 1.168 0.674  2.025 
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dFSTPA  0.0316 0.4045 0.0061 0.9376 1.032 0.467  2.281 
dHHOLD  0.5965 0.1883 10.0298 0.0015 1.816 1.255  2.627 
dHLTHC  0.0160 0.2241 0.0051 0.9432 1.016 0.655  1.576 
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